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Frequentism and Bayesianism: A Python-driven
Primer
Jake VanderPlas∗†
F
Abstract—This paper presents a brief, semi-technical comparison of the es-
sential features of the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to statistical infer-
ence, with several illustrative examples implemented in Python. The differences
between frequentism and Bayesianism fundamentally stem from differing defini-
tions of probability, a philosophical divide which leads to distinct approaches
to the solution of statistical problems as well as contrasting ways of asking
and answering questions about unknown parameters. After an example-driven
discussion of these differences, we briefly compare several leading Python sta-
tistical packages which implement frequentist inference using classical methods
and Bayesian inference using Markov Chain Monte Carlo.1
Index Terms—statistics, frequentism, Bayesian inference
Introduction
One of the first things a scientist in a data-intensive field
hears about statistics is that there are two different approaches:
frequentism and Bayesianism. Despite their importance, many
researchers never have opportunity to learn the distinctions
between them and the different practical approaches that result.
This paper seeks to synthesize the philosophical and prag-
matic aspects of this debate, so that scientists who use these
approaches might be better prepared to understand the tools
available to them. Along the way we will explore the funda-
mental philosophical disagreement between frequentism and
Bayesianism, explore the practical aspects of how this dis-
agreement affects data analysis, and discuss the ways that these
practices may affect the interpretation of scientific results.
This paper is written for scientists who have picked up some
statistical knowledge along the way, but who may not fully
appreciate the philosophical differences between frequentist
and Bayesian approaches and the effect these differences
have on both the computation and interpretation of statistical
results. Because this passing statistics knowledge generally
leans toward frequentist principles, this paper will go into
more depth on the details of Bayesian rather than frequentist
approaches. Still, it is not meant to be a full introduction
to either class of methods. In particular, concepts such as
the likelihood are assumed rather than derived, and many
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1. This paper draws heavily from content originally published in a series
of posts on the author’s blog, Pythonic Perambulations [VanderPlas2014].
advanced Bayesian and frequentist diagnostic tests are left
out in favor of illustrating the most fundamental aspects of
the approaches. For a more complete treatment, see, e.g.
[Wasserman2004] or [Gelman2004].
The Disagreement: The Definition of Probability
Fundamentally, the disagreement between frequentists and
Bayesians concerns the definition of probability.
For frequentists, probability only has meaning in terms of
a limiting case of repeated measurements. That is, if an
astronomer measures the photon flux F from a given non-
variable star, then measures it again, then again, and so on,
each time the result will be slightly different due to the
statistical error of the measuring device. In the limit of many
measurements, the frequency of any given value indicates
the probability of measuring that value. For frequentists,
probabilities are fundamentally related to frequencies of
events. This means, for example, that in a strict frequentist
view, it is meaningless to talk about the probability of the true
flux of the star: the true flux is, by definition, a single fixed
value, and to talk about an extended frequency distribution for
a fixed value is nonsense.
For Bayesians, the concept of probability is extended to
cover degrees of certainty about statements. A Bayesian
might claim to know the flux F of a star with some probability
P(F): that probability can certainly be estimated from frequen-
cies in the limit of a large number of repeated experiments,
but this is not fundamental. The probability is a statement
of the researcher’s knowledge of what the true flux is. For
Bayesians, probabilities are fundamentally related to their
own knowledge about an event. This means, for example,
that in a Bayesian view, we can meaningfully talk about the
probability that the true flux of a star lies in a given range.
That probability codifies our knowledge of the value based on
prior information and available data.
The surprising thing is that this arguably subtle difference in
philosophy can lead, in practice, to vastly different approaches
to the statistical analysis of data. Below we will explore a
few examples chosen to illustrate the differences in approach,
along with associated Python code to demonstrate the practical
aspects of the frequentist and Bayesian approaches.
A Simple Example: Photon Flux Measurements
First we will compare the frequentist and Bayesian approaches
to the solution of an extremely simple problem. Imagine that
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we point a telescope to the sky, and observe the light coming
from a single star. For simplicity, we will assume that the
star’s true photon flux is constant with time, i.e. that is it
has a fixed value F ; we will also ignore effects like sky
background systematic errors. We will assume that a series
of N measurements are performed, where the ith measurement
reports the observed flux Fi and error ei.2 The question is,
given this set of measurements D = {Fi,ei}, what is our best
estimate of the true flux F?
First we will use Python to generate some toy data to
demonstrate the two approaches to the problem. We will draw
50 samples Fi with a mean of 1000 (in arbitrary units) and a
(known) error ei:
>>> np.random.seed(2) # for reproducibility
>>> e = np.random.normal(30, 3, 50)
>>> F = np.random.normal(1000, e)
In this toy example we already know the true flux F , but
the question is this: given our measurements and errors, what
is our best point estimate of the true flux? Let’s look at a
frequentist and a Bayesian approach to solving this.
Frequentist Approach to Flux Measurement
We will start with the classical frequentist maximum likelihood
approach. Given a single observation Di = (Fi,ei), we can
compute the probability distribution of the measurement given
the true flux F given our assumption of Gaussian errors:
P(Di|F) =
(
2pie2i
)−1/2
exp
(−(Fi−F)2
2e2i
)
.
This should be read “the probability of Di given F equals ...”.
You should recognize this as a normal distribution with mean
F and standard deviation ei. We construct the likelihood by
computing the product of the probabilities for each data point:
L (D|F) =
N
∏
i=1
P(Di|F)
Here D= {Di} represents the entire set of measurements. For
reasons of both analytic simplicity and numerical accuracy, it
is often more convenient to instead consider the log-likelihood;
combining the previous two equations gives
logL (D|F) =−1
2
N
∑
i=1
[
log(2pie2i )+
(Fi−F)2
e2i
]
.
We would like to determine the value of F which maximizes
the likelihood. For this simple problem, the maximization can
be computed analytically (e.g. by setting d logL /dF |Fˆ = 0),
which results in the following point estimate of F :
Fˆ =
∑wiFi
∑wi
; wi = 1/e2i
The result is a simple weighted mean of the observed values.
Notice that in the case of equal errors ei, the weights cancel
and Fˆ is simply the mean of the observed data.
2. We will make the reasonable assumption of normally-distributed mea-
surement errors. In a Frequentist perspective, ei is the standard deviation of the
results of the single measurement event in the limit of (imaginary) repetitions
of that event. In the Bayesian perspective, ei describes the probability
distribution which quantifies our knowledge of F given the measured value
Fi.
We can go further and ask what the uncertainty of our esti-
mate is. One way this can be accomplished in the frequentist
approach is to construct a Gaussian approximation to the peak
likelihood; in this simple case the fit can be solved analytically
to give:
σFˆ =
(
N
∑
i=1
wi
)−1/2
This result can be evaluated this in Python as follows:
>>> w = 1. / e ** 2
>>> F_hat = np.sum(w * F) / np.sum(w)
>>> sigma_F = w.sum() ** -0.5
For our particular data, the result is Fˆ = 999±4.
Bayesian Approach to Flux Measurement
The Bayesian approach, as you might expect, begins and ends
with probabilities. The fundamental result of interest is our
knowledge of the parameters in question, codified by the
probability P(F |D). To compute this result, we next apply
Bayes’ theorem, a fundamental law of probability:
P(F |D) = P(D|F) P(F)
P(D)
Though Bayes’ theorem is where Bayesians get their name,
it is important to note that it is not this theorem itself that is
controversial, but the Bayesian interpretation of probability
implied by the term P(F |D). While the above formulation
makes sense given the Bayesian view of probability, the
setup is fundamentally contrary to the frequentist philosophy,
which says that probabilities have no meaning for fixed model
parameters like F . In the Bayesian conception of probability,
however, this poses no problem.
Let’s take a look at each of the terms in this expression:
• P(F |D): The posterior, which is the probability of the
model parameters given the data.
• P(D|F): The likelihood, which is proportional to the
L (D|F) used in the frequentist approach.
• P(F): The model prior, which encodes what we knew
about the model before considering the data D.
• P(D): The model evidence, which in practice amounts
to simply a normalization term.
If we set the prior P(F) ∝ 1 (a flat prior), we find
P(F |D) ∝L (D|F).
That is, with a flat prior on F , the Bayesian posterior is
maximized at precisely the same value as the frequentist
result! So despite the philosophical differences, we see that
the Bayesian and frequentist point estimates are equivalent for
this simple problem.
You might notice that we glossed over one important piece
here: the prior, P(F), which we assumed to be flat.3 The prior
allows inclusion of other information into the computation,
which becomes very useful in cases where multiple measure-
ment strategies are being combined to constrain a single model
(as is the case in, e.g. cosmological parameter estimation).
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The necessity to specify a prior, however, is one of the more
controversial pieces of Bayesian analysis.
A frequentist will point out that the prior is problematic
when no true prior information is available. Though it might
seem straightforward to use an uninformative prior like
the flat prior mentioned above, there are some surprising
subtleties involved.4 It turns out that in many situations, a
truly uninformative prior cannot exist! Frequentists point out
that the subjective choice of a prior which necessarily biases
the result should have no place in scientific data analysis.
A Bayesian would counter that frequentism doesn’t solve
this problem, but simply skirts the question. Frequentism can
often be viewed as simply a special case of the Bayesian
approach for some (implicit) choice of the prior: a Bayesian
would say that it’s better to make this implicit choice explicit,
even if the choice might include some subjectivity. Further-
more, as we will see below, the question frequentism answers
is not always the question the researcher wants to ask.
Where The Results Diverge
In the simple example above, the frequentist and Bayesian
approaches give basically the same result. In light of this,
arguments over the use of a prior and the philosophy of
probability may seem frivolous. However, while it is easy to
show that the two approaches are often equivalent for simple
problems, it is also true that they can diverge greatly in other
situations. In practice, this divergence most often makes itself
most clear in two different ways:
1. The handling of nuisance parameters: i.e. param-
eters which affect the final result, but are not other-
wise of interest.
2. The different handling of uncertainty: for example,
the subtle (and often overlooked) difference between
frequentist confidence intervals and Bayesian credi-
ble regions.
We will discuss examples of these below.
Nuisance Parameters: Bayes’ Billiards Game
We will start by discussing the first point: nuisance parameters.
A nuisance parameter is any quantity whose value is not
directly relevant to the goal of an analysis, but is nevertheless
required to determine the result which is of interest. For exam-
ple, we might have a situation similar to the flux measurement
above, but in which the errors ei are unknown. One potential
approach is to treat these errors as nuisance parameters.
Here we consider an example of nuisance parameters bor-
rowed from [Eddy2004] that, in one form or another, dates
all the way back to the posthumously-published 1763 paper
written by Thomas Bayes himself [Bayes1763]. The setting is
3. A flat prior is an example of an improper prior: that is, it cannot be
normalized. In practice, we can remedy this by imposing some bounds on
possible values: say, 0 < F < Ftot , the total flux of all sources in the sky. As
this normalization term also appears in the denominator of Bayes’ theorem,
it does not affect the posterior.
4. The flat prior in this case can be motivated by maximum entropy;
see, e.g. [Jeffreys1946]. Still, the use of uninformative priors like this often
raises eyebrows among frequentists: there are good arguments that even
“uninformative” priors can add information; see e.g. [Evans2002].
a gambling game in which Alice and Bob bet on the outcome
of a process they can’t directly observe.
Alice and Bob enter a room. Behind a curtain there is a
billiard table, which they cannot see. Their friend Carol rolls
a ball down the table, and marks where it lands. Once this mark
is in place, Carol begins rolling new balls down the table. If
the ball lands to the left of the mark, Alice gets a point; if
it lands to the right of the mark, Bob gets a point. We can
assume that Carol’s rolls are unbiased: that is, the balls have
an equal chance of ending up anywhere on the table. The first
person to reach six points wins the game.
Here the location of the mark (determined by the first roll)
can be considered a nuisance parameter: it is unknown and
not of immediate interest, but it clearly must be accounted for
when predicting the outcome of subsequent rolls. If this first
roll settles far to the right, then subsequent rolls will favor
Alice. If it settles far to the left, Bob will be favored instead.
Given this setup, we seek to answer this question: In a
particular game, after eight rolls, Alice has five points and
Bob has three points. What is the probability that Bob will get
six points and win the game?
Intuitively, we realize that because Alice received five of the
eight points, the marker placement likely favors her. Given that
she has three opportunities to get a sixth point before Bob can
win, she seems to have clinched it. But quantitatively speaking,
what is the probability that Bob will persist to win?
A Naïve Frequentist Approach
Someone following a classical frequentist approach might
reason as follows:
To determine the result, we need to estimate the location
of the marker. We will quantify this marker placement as a
probability p that any given roll lands in Alice’s favor. Because
five balls out of eight fell on Alice’s side of the marker, we
compute the maximum likelihood estimate of p, given by:
pˆ = 5/8,
a result follows in a straightforward manner from the binomial
likelihood. Assuming this maximum likelihood probability, we
can compute the probability that Bob will win, which requires
him to get a point in each of the next three rolls. This is given
by:
P(B) = (1− pˆ)3
Thus, we find that the probability of Bob winning is 0.053, or
odds against Bob winning of 18 to 1.
A Bayesian Approach
A Bayesian approach to this problem involves marginalizing
(i.e. integrating) over the unknown p so that, assuming the
prior is accurate, our result is agnostic to its actual value. In
this vein, we will consider the following quantities:
• B = Bob Wins
• D = observed data, i.e. D = (nA,nB) = (5,3)
• p = unknown probability that a ball lands on Alice’s side
during the current game
We want to compute P(B|D); that is, the probability that
Bob wins given the observation that Alice currently has five
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points to Bob’s three. A Bayesian would recognize that this
expression is a marginal probability which can be computed
by integrating over the joint distribution P(B, p|D):
P(B|D)≡
∫ ∞
−∞
P(B, p|D)dp
This identity follows from the definition of conditional prob-
ability, and the law of total probability: that is, it is a fun-
damental consequence of probability axioms and will always
be true. Even a frequentist would recognize this; they would
simply disagree with the interpretation of P(p) as being a
measure of uncertainty of knowledge of the parameter p.
To compute this result, we will manipulate the above
expression for P(B|D) until we can express it in terms of other
quantities that we can compute.
We start by applying the definition of conditional probability
to expand the term P(B, p|D):
P(B|D) =
∫
P(B|p,D)P(p|D)d p
Next we use Bayes’ rule to rewrite P(p|D):
P(B|D) =
∫
P(B|p,D)P(D|p)P(p)
P(D)
d p
Finally, using the same probability identity we started with,
we can expand P(D) in the denominator to find:
P(B|D) =
∫
P(B|p,D)P(D|p)P(p)d p∫
P(D|p)P(p)d p
Now the desired probability is expressed in terms of three
quantities that we can compute:
• P(B|p,D): This term is proportional to the frequentist
likelihood we used above. In words: given a marker
placement p and Alice’s 5 wins to Bob’s 3, what is the
probability that Bob will go on to six wins? Bob needs
three wins in a row, i.e. P(B|p,D) = (1− p)3.
• P(D|p): this is another easy-to-compute term. In words:
given a probability p, what is the likelihood of exactly 5
positive outcomes out of eight trials? The answer comes
from the Binomial distribution: P(D|p) ∝ p5(1− p)3
• P(p): this is our prior on the probability p. By the
problem definition, we can assume that p is evenly drawn
between 0 and 1. That is, P(p) ∝ 1 for 0≤ p≤ 1.
Putting this all together and simplifying gives
P(B|D) =
∫ 1
0 (1− p)6 p5d p∫ 1
0 (1− p)3 p5d p
.
These integrals are instances of the beta function, so we can
quickly evaluate the result using scipy:
>>> from scipy.special import beta
>>> P_B_D = beta(6+1, 5+1) / beta(3+1, 5+1)
This gives P(B|D) = 0.091, or odds of 10 to 1 against Bob
winning.
Discussion
The Bayesian approach gives odds of 10 to 1 against Bob,
while the naïve frequentist approach gives odds of 18 to 1
against Bob. So which one is correct?
For a simple problem like this, we can answer this question
empirically by simulating a large number of games and count
the fraction of suitable games which Bob goes on to win. This
can be coded in a couple dozen lines of Python (see part II of
[VanderPlas2014]). The result of such a simulation confirms
the Bayesian result: 10 to 1 against Bob winning.
So what is the takeaway: is frequentism wrong? Not nec-
essarily: in this case, the incorrect result is more a matter
of the approach being “naïve” than it being “frequentist”.
The approach above does not consider how p may vary.
There exist frequentist methods that can address this by,
e.g. applying a transformation and conditioning of the data
to isolate dependence on p, or by performing a Bayesian-
like integral over the sampling distribution of the frequentist
estimator pˆ.
Another potential frequentist response is that the question
itself is posed in a way that does not lend itself to the classical,
frequentist approach. A frequentist might instead hope to give
the answer in terms of null tests or confidence intervals: that
is, they might devise a procedure to construct limits which
would provably bound the correct answer in 100× (1−α)
percent of similar trials, for some value of α – say, 0.05. We
will discuss the meaning of such confidence intervals below.
There is one clear common point of these two frequentist
responses: both require some degree of effort and/or special
expertise in classical methods; perhaps a suitable frequen-
tist approach would be immediately obvious to an expert
statistician, but is not particularly obvious to a statistical lay-
person. In this sense, it could be argued that for a problem
such as this (i.e. with a well-motivated prior), Bayesianism
provides a more natural framework for handling nuisance
parameters: by simple algebraic manipulation of a few well-
known axioms of probability interpreted in a Bayesian sense,
we straightforwardly arrive at the correct answer without need
for other special statistical expertise.
Confidence vs. Credibility: Jaynes’ Truncated Exponential
A second major consequence of the philosophical difference
between frequentism and Bayesianism is in the handling of
uncertainty, exemplified by the standard tools of each method:
frequentist confidence intervals (CIs) and Bayesian credible
regions (CRs). Despite their apparent similarity, the two ap-
proaches are fundamentally different. Both are statements of
probability, but the probability refers to different aspects of the
computed bounds. For example, when constructing a standard
95% bound about a parameter θ :
• A Bayesian would say: “Given our observed data, there
is a 95% probability that the true value of θ lies within
the credible region”.
• A frequentist would say: “If this experiment is repeated
many times, in 95% of these cases the computed confi-
dence interval will contain the true θ .”5
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Notice the subtle difference: the Bayesian makes a statement
of probability about the parameter value given a fixed credible
region. The frequentist makes a statement of probability about
the confidence interval itself given a fixed parameter value.
This distinction follows straightforwardly from the definition
of probability discussed above: the Bayesian probability is
a statement of degree of knowledge about a parameter; the
frequentist probability is a statement of long-term limiting
frequency of quantities (such as the CI) derived from the data.
This difference must necessarily affect our interpretation
of results. For example, it is common in scientific literature
to see it claimed that it is 95% certain that an unknown
parameter lies within a given 95% CI, but this is not the
case! This is erroneously applying the Bayesian interpretation
to a frequentist construction. This frequentist oversight can
perhaps be forgiven, as under most circumstances (such as the
simple flux measurement example above), the Bayesian CR
and frequentist CI will more-or-less overlap. But, as we will
see below, this overlap cannot always be assumed, especially
in the case of non-Gaussian distributions constrained by few
data points. As a result, this common misinterpretation of the
frequentist CI can lead to dangerously erroneous conclusions.
To demonstrate a situation in which the frequentist con-
fidence interval and the Bayesian credibility region do not
overlap, let us turn to an example given by E.T. Jaynes, a
20th century physicist who wrote extensively on statistical
inference. In his words, consider a device that
“...will operate without failure for a time θ
because of a protective chemical inhibitor injected
into it; but at time θ the supply of the chemical is
exhausted, and failures then commence, following
the exponential failure law. It is not feasible to
observe the depletion of this inhibitor directly; one
can observe only the resulting failures. From data
on actual failure times, estimate the time θ of
guaranteed safe operation...” [Jaynes1976]
Essentially, we have data D drawn from the model:
P(x|θ) =
{
exp(θ − x) , x > θ
0 , x < θ
}
where p(x|θ) gives the probability of failure at time x, given
an inhibitor which lasts for a time θ . We observe some failure
times, say D = {10,12,15}, and ask for 95% uncertainty
bounds on the value of θ .
First, let’s think about what common-sense would tell us.
Given the model, an event can only happen after a time θ .
Turning this around tells us that the upper-bound for θ must
be min(D). So, for our particular data, we would immediately
write θ ≤ 10. With this in mind, let’s explore how a frequentist
and a Bayesian approach compare to this observation.
Truncated Exponential: A Frequentist Approach
In the frequentist paradigm, we’d like to compute a confidence
interval on the value of θ . We might start by observing that
5. [Wasserman2004], however, notes on p. 92 that we need not consider
repetitions of the same experiment; it’s sufficient to consider repetitions of
any correctly-performed frequentist procedure.
the population mean is given by
E(x) =
∫ ∞
0
xp(x)dx = θ +1.
So, using the sample mean as the point estimate of E(x), we
have an unbiased estimator for θ given by
θˆ =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
xi−1.
In the large-N limit, the central limit theorem tells us that the
sampling distribution is normal with standard deviation given
by the standard error of the mean: σ2θˆ = 1/N, and we can write
the 95% (i.e. 2σ ) confidence interval as
CIlarge N =
(
θˆ −2N−1/2, θˆ +2N−1/2
)
For our particular observed data, this gives a confidence
interval around our unbiased estimator of CI(θ)= (10.2,12.5),
entirely above our common-sense bound of θ < 10! We
might hope that this discrepancy is due to our use of the
large-N approximation with a paltry N = 3 samples. A more
careful treatment of the problem (See [Jaynes1976] or part
III of [VanderPlas2014]) gives the exact confidence interval
(10.2,12.2): the 95% confidence interval entirely excludes the
sensible bound θ < 10!
Truncated Exponential: A Bayesian Approach
A Bayesian approach to the problem starts with Bayes’ rule:
P(θ |D) = P(D|θ)P(θ)
P(D)
.
We use the likelihood given by
P(D|θ) ∝
N
∏
i=1
P(xi|θ)
and, in the absence of other information, use an uninformative
flat prior on θ to find
P(θ |D) ∝
{
N exp [N(θ −min(D))] , θ < min(D)
0 , θ > min(D)
}
where min(D) is the smallest value in the data D, which
enters because of the truncation of P(xi|θ). Because P(θ |D)
increases exponentially up to the cutoff, the shortest 95%
credibility interval (θ1,θ2) will be given by θ2 =min(D), and
θ1 given by the solution to the equation∫ θ2
θ1
P(θ |D)dθ = f
which has the solution
θ1 = θ2+
1
N
ln
[
1− f (1− e−Nθ2)
]
.
For our particular data, the Bayesian credible region is
CR(θ) = (9.0,10.0)
which agrees with our common-sense bound.
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Discussion
Why do the frequentist CI and Bayesian CR give such different
results? The reason goes back to the definitions of the CI and
CR, and to the fact that the two approaches are answering
different questions. The Bayesian CR answers a question about
the value of θ itself (the probability that the parameter is in the
fixed CR), while the frequentist CI answers a question about
the procedure used to construct the CI (the probability that
any potential CI will contain the fixed parameter).
Using Monte Carlo simulations, it is possible to confirm
that both the above results correctly answer their respective
questions (see [VanderPlas2014], III). In particular, 95% of
frequentist CIs constructed using data drawn from this model
in fact contain the true θ . Our particular data are simply
among the unhappy 5% which the confidence interval misses.
But this makes clear the danger of misapplying the Bayesian
interpretation to a CI: this particular CI is not 95% likely to
contain the true value of θ ; it is in fact 0% likely!
This shows that when using frequentist methods on fixed
data, we must carefully keep in mind what question frequen-
tism is answering. Frequentism does not seek a probabilistic
statement about a fixed interval as the Bayesian approach does;
it instead seeks probabilistic statements about an ensemble of
constructed intervals, with the particular computed interval
just a single draw from among them. Despite this, it is common
to see a 95% confidence interval interpreted in the Bayesian
sense: as a fixed interval that the parameter is expected to
be found in 95% of the time. As seen clearly here, this
interpretation is flawed, and should be carefully avoided.
Though we used a correct unbiased frequentist estimator
above, it should be emphasized that the unbiased estimator is
not always optimal for any given problem: especially one with
small N and/or censored models; see, e.g. [Hardy2003]. Other
frequentist estimators are available: for example, if the (biased)
maximum likelihood estimator were used here instead, the
confidence interval would be very similar to the Bayesian
credible region derived above. Regardless of the choice of
frequentist estimator, however, the correct interpretation of the
CI is the same: it gives probabilities concerning the recipe
for constructing limits, not for the parameter values given
the observed data. For sensible parameter constraints from
a single dataset, Bayesianism may be preferred, especially if
the difficulties of uninformative priors can be avoided through
the use of true prior information.
Bayesianism in Practice: Markov Chain Monte Carlo
Though Bayesianism has some nice features in theory, in
practice it can be extremely computationally intensive: while
simple problems like those examined above lend themselves to
relatively easy analytic integration, real-life Bayesian compu-
tations often require numerical integration of high-dimensional
parameter spaces.
A turning-point in practical Bayesian computation was the
development and application of sampling methods such as
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). MCMC is a class
of algorithms which can efficiently characterize even high-
dimensional posterior distributions through drawing of ran-
domized samples such that the points are distributed according
to the posterior. A detailed discussion of MCMC is well
beyond the scope of this paper; an excellent introduction
can be found in [Gelman2004]. Below, we will propose a
straightforward model and compare a standard frequentist
approach with three MCMC implementations available in
Python.
Application: A Simple Linear Model
As an example of a more realistic data-driven analysis, let’s
consider a simple three-parameter linear model which fits a
straight-line to data with unknown errors. The parameters will
be the the y-intercept α , the slope β , and the (unknown)
normal scatter σ about the line.
For data D = {xi,yi}, the model is
yˆ(xi|α,β ) = α+βxi,
and the likelihood is the product of the Gaussian distribution
for each point:
L (D|α,β ,σ) = (2piσ2)−N/2
N
∏
i=1
exp
[−[yi− yˆ(xi|α,β )]2
2σ2
]
.
We will evaluate this model on the following data set:
import numpy as np
np.random.seed(42) # for repeatability
theta_true = (25, 0.5)
xdata = 100 * np.random.random(20)
ydata = theta_true[0] + theta_true[1] * xdata
ydata = np.random.normal(ydata, 10) # add error
Below we will consider a frequentist solution to this problem
computed with the statsmodels package6, as well as a Bayesian
solution computed with several MCMC implementations in
Python: emcee7, PyMC8, and PyStan9. A full discussion of
the strengths and weaknesses of the various MCMC algorithms
used by the packages is out of scope for this paper, as is a
full discussion of performance benchmarks for the packages.
Rather, the purpose of this section is to show side-by-side
examples of the Python APIs of the packages. First, though,
we will consider a frequentist solution.
Frequentist Solution
A frequentist solution can be found by computing the maxi-
mum likelihood point estimate. For standard linear problems
such as this, the result can be computed using efficient linear
algebra. If we define the parameter vector, θ = [α β ]T ; the
response vector, Y = [y1 y2 y3 · · · yN ]T ; and the design matrix,
X =
[
1 1 1 · · · 1
x1 x2 x3 · · · xN
]T
,
it can be shown that the maximum likelihood solution is
θˆ = (XT X)−1(XTY ).
6. statsmodels: Statistics in Python http://statsmodels.sourceforge.net/
7. emcee: The MCMC Hammer http://dan.iel.fm/emcee/
8. PyMC: Bayesian Inference in Python http://pymc-devs.github.io/pymc/
9. PyStan: The Python Interface to Stan https://pystan.readthedocs.org/
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The confidence interval around this value is an ellipse in
parameter space defined by the following matrix:
Σθˆ ≡
[
σ2α σαβ
σαβ σ2β
]
= σ2(MT M)−1.
Here σ is our unknown error term; it can be estimated based
on the variance of the residuals about the fit. The off-diagonal
elements of Σθˆ are the correlated uncertainty between the
estimates. In code, the computation looks like this:
>>> X = np.vstack([np.ones_like(xdata), xdata]).T
>>> theta_hat = np.linalg.solve(np.dot(X.T, X),
... np.dot(X.T, ydata))
>>> y_hat = np.dot(X, theta_hat)
>>> sigma_hat = np.std(ydata - y_hat)
>>> Sigma = sigma_hat ** 2 *\
... np.linalg.inv(np.dot(X.T, X))
The 1σ and 2σ results are shown by the black ellipses in
Figure 1.
In practice, the frequentist approach often relies on many
more statistal diagnostics beyond the maximum likelihood and
confidence interval. These can be computed quickly using
convenience routines built-in to the statsmodels package
[Seabold2010]. For this problem, it can be used as follows:
>>> import statsmodels.api as sm # version 0.5
>>> X = sm.add_constant(xdata)
>>> result = sm.OLS(ydata, X).fit()
>>> sigma_hat = result.params
>>> Sigma = result.cov_params()
>>> print(result.summary2())
====================================================
Model: OLS AIC: 147.773
Dependent Variable: y BIC: 149.765
No. Observations: 20 Log-Likelihood: -71.887
Df Model: 1 F-statistic: 41.97
Df Residuals: 18 Prob (F-statistic): 4.3e-06
R-squared: 0.70 Scale: 86.157
Adj. R-squared: 0.68
----------------------------------------------------
Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| [0.025 0.975]
----------------------------------------------------
const 24.6361 3.7871 6.5053 0.0000 16.6797 32.592
x1 0.4483 0.0692 6.4782 0.0000 0.3029 0.593
----------------------------------------------------
Omnibus: 1.996 Durbin-Watson: 2.75
Prob(Omnibus): 0.369 Jarque-Bera (JB): 1.63
Skew: 0.651 Prob(JB): 0.44
Kurtosis: 2.486 Condition No.: 100
====================================================
The summary output includes many advanced statistics which
we don’t have space to fully discuss here. For a trained
practitioner these diagnostics are very useful for evaluating and
comparing fits, especially for more complicated models; see
[Wasserman2004] and the statsmodels project documentation
for more details.
Bayesian Solution: Overview
The Bayesian result is encapsulated in the posterior, which
is proportional to the product of the likelihood and the
prior; in this case we must be aware that a flat prior is not
uninformative. Because of the nature of the slope, a flat prior
leads to a much higher probability for steeper slopes. One
might imagine addressing this by transforming variables, e.g.
using a flat prior on the angle the line makes with the x-
axis rather than the slope. It turns out that the appropriate
change of variables can be determined much more rigorously
by following arguments first developed by [Jeffreys1946].
Our model is given by y= α+βx with probability element
P(α,β )dαdβ . By symmetry, we could just as well have
written x=α ′+β ′y with probability element Q(α ′,β ′)dα ′dβ ′.
It then follows that (α ′,β ′) = (−β−1α,β−1). Computing the
determinant of the Jacobian of this transformation, we can
then show that Q(α ′,β ′) = β 3P(α,β ). The symmetry of the
problem requires equivalence of P and Q, or β 3P(α,β ) =
P(−β−1α,β−1), which is a functional equation satisfied by
P(α,β ) ∝ (1+β 2)−3/2.
This turns out to be equivalent to choosing flat priors on the
alternate variables (θ ,α⊥) = (tan−1β ,α cosθ).
Through similar arguments based on the invariance of σ
under a change of units, we can show that
P(σ) ∝ 1/σ ,
which is most commonly known a the Jeffreys Prior for
scale factors after [Jeffreys1946], and is equivalent to flat
prior on logσ . Putting these together, we find the following
uninformative prior for our linear regression problem:
P(α,β ,σ) ∝
1
σ
(1+β 2)−3/2.
With this prior and the above likelihood, we are prepared to
numerically evaluate the posterior via MCMC.
Solution with emcee
The emcee package [ForemanMackey2013] is a lightweight
pure-Python package which implements Affine Invariant En-
semble MCMC [Goodman2010], a sophisticated version of
MCMC sampling. To use emcee, all that is required is to
define a Python function representing the logarithm of the
posterior. For clarity, we will factor this definition into two
functions, the log-prior and the log-likelihood:
import emcee # version 2.0
def log_prior(theta):
alpha, beta, sigma = theta
if sigma < 0:
return -np.inf # log(0)
else:
return (-1.5 * np.log(1 + beta**2)
- np.log(sigma))
def log_like(theta, x, y):
alpha, beta, sigma = theta
y_model = alpha + beta * x
return -0.5 * np.sum(np.log(2*np.pi*sigma**2) +
(y-y_model)**2 / sigma**2)
def log_posterior(theta, x, y):
return log_prior(theta) + log_like(theta,x,y)
Next we set up the computation. emcee combines multiple
interacting “walkers”, each of which results in its own Markov
chain. We will also specify a burn-in period, to allow the
chains to stabilize prior to drawing our final traces:
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ndim = 3 # number of parameters in the model
nwalkers = 50 # number of MCMC walkers
nburn = 1000 # "burn-in" to stabilize chains
nsteps = 2000 # number of MCMC steps to take
starting_guesses = np.random.rand(nwalkers, ndim)
Now we call the sampler and extract the trace:
sampler = emcee.EnsembleSampler(nwalkers, ndim,
log_posterior,
args=[xdata,ydata])
sampler.run_mcmc(starting_guesses, nsteps)
# chain is of shape (nwalkers, nsteps, ndim):
# discard burn-in points and reshape:
trace = sampler.chain[:, nburn:, :]
trace = trace.reshape(-1, ndim).T
The result is shown by the blue curve in Figure 1.
Solution with PyMC
The PyMC package [Patil2010] is an MCMC implementation
written in Python and Fortran. It makes use of the classic
Metropolis-Hastings MCMC sampler [Gelman2004], and in-
cludes many built-in features, such as support for efficient
sampling of common prior distributions. Because of this, it
requires more specialized boilerplate than does emcee, but the
result is a very powerful tool for flexible Bayesian inference.
The example below uses PyMC version 2.3; as of this
writing, there exists an early release of version 3.0, which is a
complete rewrite of the package with a more streamlined API
and more efficient computational backend. To use PyMC, we
first we define all the variables using its classes and decorators:
import pymc # version 2.3
alpha = pymc.Uniform(’alpha’, -100, 100)
@pymc.stochastic(observed=False)
def beta(value=0):
return -1.5 * np.log(1 + value**2)
@pymc.stochastic(observed=False)
def sigma(value=1):
return -np.log(abs(value))
# Define the form of the model and likelihood
@pymc.deterministic
def y_model(x=xdata, alpha=alpha, beta=beta):
return alpha + beta * x
y = pymc.Normal(’y’, mu=y_model, tau=1./sigma**2,
observed=True, value=ydata)
# package the full model in a dictionary
model = dict(alpha=alpha, beta=beta, sigma=sigma,
y_model=y_model, y=y)
Next we run the chain and extract the trace:
S = pymc.MCMC(model)
S.sample(iter=100000, burn=50000)
trace = [S.trace(’alpha’)[:], S.trace(’beta’)[:],
S.trace(’sigma’)[:]]
The result is shown by the red curve in Figure 1.
Solution with PyStan
PyStan is the official Python interface to Stan, a probabilis-
tic programming language implemented in C++ and making
use of a Hamiltonian MCMC using a No U-Turn Sampler
[Hoffman2014]. The Stan language is specifically designed
for the expression of probabilistic models; PyStan lets Stan
models specified in the form of Python strings be parsed,
compiled, and executed by the Stan library. Because of this,
PyStan is the least “Pythonic” of the three frameworks:
import pystan # version 2.2
model_code = """
data {
int<lower=0> N; // number of points
real x[N]; // x values
real y[N]; // y values
}
parameters {
real alpha_perp;
real<lower=-pi()/2, upper=pi()/2> theta;
real log_sigma;
}
transformed parameters {
real alpha;
real beta;
real sigma;
real ymodel[N];
alpha <- alpha_perp / cos(theta);
beta <- sin(theta);
sigma <- exp(log_sigma);
for (j in 1:N)
ymodel[j] <- alpha + beta * x[j];
}
model {
y ~ normal(ymodel, sigma);
}
"""
# perform the fit & extract traces
data = {’N’: len(xdata), ’x’: xdata, ’y’: ydata}
fit = pystan.stan(model_code=model_code, data=data,
iter=25000, chains=4)
tr = fit.extract()
trace = [tr[’alpha’], tr[’beta’], tr[’sigma’]]
The result is shown by the green curve in Figure 1.
Comparison
The 1σ and 2σ posterior credible regions computed with these
three packages are shown beside the corresponding frequentist
confidence intervals in Figure 1. The frequentist result gives
slightly tighter bounds; this is primarily due to the confidence
interval being computed assuming a single maximum likeli-
hood estimate of the unknown scatter, σ (this is analogous to
the use of the single point estimate for the nuisance parameter
p in the billiard game, above). This interpretation can be
confirmed by plotting the Bayesian posterior conditioned on
the maximum likelihood estimate σˆ ; this gives a credible
region much closer to the frequentist confidence interval.
The similarity of the three MCMC results belie the dif-
ferences in algorithms used to compute them: by default,
PyMC uses a Metropolis-Hastings sampler, PyStan uses a
No U-Turn Sampler (NUTS), while emcee uses an affine-
invariant ensemble sampler. These approaches are known to
have differing performance characteristics depending on the
features of the posterior being explored. As expected for the
near-Gaussian posterior used here, the three approaches give
very similar results.
A main apparent difference between the packages is the
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Fig. 1: Comparison of model fits using frequentist maximum like-
lihood, and Bayesian MCMC using three Python packages: emcee,
PyMC, and PyStan.
Python interface. Emcee is perhaps the simplest, while PyMC
requires more package-specific boilerplate code. PyStan is the
most complicated, as the model specification requires directly
writing a string of Stan code.
Conclusion
This paper has offered a brief philosophical and practical
glimpse at the differences between frequentist and Bayesian
approaches to statistical analysis. These differences have their
root in differing conceptions of probability: frequentists define
probability as related to frequencies of repeated events, while
Bayesians define probability as a measure of uncertainty. In
practice, this means that frequentists generally quantify the
properties of data-derived quantities in light of fixed model
parameters, while Bayesians generally quantify the properties
of unknown models parameters in light of observed data. This
philosophical distinction often makes little difference in simple
problems, but becomes important within more sophisticated
analysis.
We first considered the case of nuisance parameters, and
showed that Bayesianism offers more natural machinery to
deal with nuisance parameters through marginalization. Of
course, this marginalization depends on having an accurate
prior probability for the parameter being marginalized.
Next we considered the difference in the handling of
uncertainty, comparing frequentist confidence intervals with
Bayesian credible regions. We showed that when attempting
to find a single, fixed interval bounding the true value of a
parameter, the Bayesian solution answers the question that
researchers most often ask. The frequentist solution can be
informative; we just must be careful to correctly interpret the
frequentist confidence interval.
Finally, we combined these ideas and showed several ex-
amples of the use of frequentism and Bayesianism on a more
realistic linear regression problem, using several mature pack-
ages available in the Python language ecosystem. Together,
these packages offer a set of tools for statistical analysis in
both the frequentist and Bayesian frameworks.
So which approach is best? That is somewhat a matter
of personal ideology, but also depends on the nature of the
problem at hand. Frequentist approaches are often easily
computed and are well-suited to truly repeatible processes
and measurements, but can hit snags with small sets of data
and models which depart strongly from Gaussian. Frequentist
tools for these situations do exist, but often require subtle
considerations and specialized expertise. Bayesian approaches
require specification of a potentially subjective prior, and
often involve intensive computation via MCMC. However,
they are often conceptually more straightforward, and pose
results in a way that is much closer to the questions a scientist
wishes to answer: i.e. how do these particular data constrain
the unknowns in a certain model? When used with correct
understanding of their application, both sets of statistical tools
can be used to effectively interpret of a wide variety of
scientific and technical results.
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